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Abstract
A theoretical model of truly autonomic computing systems
(ACS), with infinitely many constraints, is proposed. An
argument similar to Turing’s for the unsolvability of the
halting problem, which is permitted in classical logic,
shows that such systems cannot exist. Turing’s argument
fails in the recently proposed non-Aristotelian finitary
logic (NAFL), which permits the existence of ACS. NAFL
also justifies quantum superposition and entanglement,
which are essential ingredients of quantum algorithms,
and resolves the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox
in favour of quantum mechanics and non-locality. NAFL
requires that the autonomic manager (AM) must be
conceptually and architecturally distinct from the
managed element, in order for the ACS to exist as a non-
self-referential entity. Such a scenario is possible if the
AM uses quantum algorithms and is protected from all
problems by (unbreakable) quantum encryption, while the
managed element remains classical. NAFL supports such
a link between autonomic and quantum computing, with
the AM existing as a metamathematical entity. NAFL also
allows quantum algorithms to access truly random
elements and thereby supports non-standard models of
quantum (hyper-) computation that permit infinite
parallelism.
1. Introduction
The essential requirements of autonomic computing
systems (ACS) [1-5] are that they should be self-defining,
self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-
protective. They are also adaptive to their environments,
require open industry standards and anticipate the
optimized resources needed while keeping their
complexity hidden. These requirements, first spelt out by
Paul Horn [1], make an ACS an extremely complex
object. While the intuitive meanings of these
requirements are clear, providing precise mathematical
definitions is a very difficult task because of two factors:
(a) In principle, there are infinitely many constraints to be
satisfied and this makes an ACS an infinitary entity.
(b) An ACS is seemingly a self-referential entity as well
that needs to function, in principle, without human
intervention.
In Sec. 2, a simple theoretical model of such an ACS
is proposed. Any attempt at a mathematical
characterization of an ACS must first necessarily address
the issue of existence – can an ACS satisfying such a
complex set of requirements exist in principle? In Sec. 3
of this paper, it is demonstrated, via an argument similar
to Turing’s for the unsolvability of the halting problem,
that the existence of a non-trivial ACS is not possible
within classical first-order predicate logic (FOPL). The
issue of existence is also examined from the point of view
of the non-Aristotelian finitary logic (NAFL, see Sec. 5)
proposed by the first author [6-8]. It is demonstrated in
Sec. 6 that Turing’s argument fails in NAFL, which can
therefore support the existence of an ACS. Further,
NAFL justifies quantum superposition and entanglement,
which are essential features of quantum algorithms, and
resolves the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox in
favour of quantum mechanics (see Sec. 5). It is argued in
Sec. 7 that autonomic and quantum computing are
possibly linked, i.e., quantum algorithms may be essential
for implementing certain aspects of our theoretical model
of an ACS. Further, NAFL has the potential to provide
the correct logical framework for supporting this link.
Therefore further development of NAFL, in particular, an
NAFL framework for real analysis and then quantum
mechanics, is strongly indicated for theoretical study of
quantum and autonomic computing systems. This
analysis should also be the starting point for a theoretical
description and complexity analysis of practically useful
autonomic computing systems, in which the number of
constraints is taken as finite. In the concluding remarks
(Sec. 8), some brief comments are made on the
conceptual advantages of NAFL over intuitionistic,
constructive and quantum logics. An overview of our
proposed scheme for an ACS is given in Sec. 4.
22. Proposed generic model of an ACS
A general computing system (CS) can in principle
have infinitely many possible initial states. For example,
a network could possibly admit an arbitrary number of
servers. Or databases containing an arbitrarily large
amount of data can be added to an existing system. For
the purposes of this paper, present physical limitations of
space or memory, including quantum limitations on
miniaturization, are ignored. In general, when a problem -
- which could be a virus, for example -- afflicts the CS, it
requires a response (automated or through human
intervention) from the CS, resulting in a new initial state,
which could trigger a new (version of the) problem. This
requires another response from the CS and in principle,
this loop could continue ad infinitum for the purposes of
this paper. In the case of an autonomic system, whether
the re-configurations converge to a desirable initial state
is an important issue for control theory, but is not dealt
with in this paper. Here “problem” is defined very
broadly, to include any change to the CS, whether
deliberate or unanticipated, legitimate or illegitimate. For
example, “problems” of a CS could include, among other
possibilities, upgradation of computing power and/or
memory, partial or total power/hardware failure, virus
attacks, server crashes or memory failures leading to loss
of data, an increase in the number of
users/servers/databases, etc.
The infinite class S of all candidate initial states of a
hypothetical computing system and the infinite class P of
all candidate “problems” afflicting (all initial states of)
this CS are both recursively enumerable, which
essentially means that the members of S and P can be
enumerated or listed by an algorithm (which may run
forever). Of course, such recursive enumerability is a vital
requirement for the existence of an ACS; as shown in
Sec. 6, this requirement is particularly unproblematic in
the logic NAFL [6-8], wherein these classes are recursive.
Let {S1, S2,…, Si, Si+1, …} and {P1, P2,…, Pi, Pi+1,…} be
enumerations of S and P respectively. The elements of S
and P are essentially classical algorithms that simulate
initial states and problems in a suitable formal language.
The (ideal, generic) ACS consists of an “autonomic
manager” (AM) that monitors the functioning of this CS
and takes suitable corrective action whenever problems
occur. In particular, AM is equipped with an algorithm W
that answers all possible questions of the form “Does
initial state Si correctly handle problem Pj in an optimal
manner?”. If the answer is “yes”, then AM takes no action
and if the answer is “no”, AM switches CS to a new
initial state that does handle Pj in the most optimal
manner possible. Of the possibly infinitely many
candidates for such a new initial state, AM makes the
choice by a suitable optimization. A very important
assumption is that the AM is completely hidden from all
“problems”, in particular, viruses; in other words, AM is
not part of any initial state. Otherwise, it is obvious that a
virus could be designed to disrupt the functioning of AM
and make the purported ACS fail (i.e., require human
intervention). Clearly, this assumption requires that the
software for AM must be encrypted in such a way that it
is in principle unbreakable. This is not possible with the
classical encryption techniques permitted by FOPL, but
can be realized if quantum encryption becomes feasible
(see the sections on classical and quantum cryptography
in Ref. [26]; in particular, note that the unbreakable codes
claimed in classical cryptography require the generation
of truly random numbers, not possible in classical
computation). As will be shown in Sec. 7, this is one of
the links between autonomic and quantum computing that
can be supported in NAFL. The above definition of an
ACS could, in principle, incorporate all the requirements
mentioned in Sec. 1.
3. ACS cannot exist within FOPL
The reader may recognize the similarity to Turing’s
halting problem when considering the question of
existence of the algorithm W. A diagonalization argument
can be used as follows, to show that W cannot exist
according to FOPL (which permits only standard
computing techniques or Turing machines). Let V be a
problem that uses W to function as follows. If W
computes that the ith problem Pi is not correctly handled
by the ith initial state Si, then V decides not to affect Si; on
the other hand, if W computes that Pi is correctly handled
by (or, in general, does not affect) Si, then V decides to
defeat any protective measures of Si (if they exist) and
affect Si. Since V must belong to any listing of P, we
obtain the usual contradiction that some initial state must
both be affected by and not affected by V.  From this
contradiction, one concludes that the list of yes-no
answers required to be provided by W is not recursively
enumerable in FOPL and therefore W does not exist.
Hence FOPL predicts that genuinely autonomic
computing systems that use only classical Turing
machines cannot exist.
Note that V may be thought of as a master virus, while
AM includes within it a master anti-virus system. Here
we have assumed that given any anti-virus system, there
always exists a virus that can fool it and that V will be
able to generate the appropriate virus software. This
assumption is justified for the purposes of establishing the
proof-by-contradiction within FOPL, since if W exists as
assumed, it must already be able to analyze the anti-virus
software of an arbitrary initial state to decide if it can
correctly handle an arbitrary virus. One can easily see that
V has essentially the same capability as AM, which has
already been assumed to exist for the purposes of the
proof. The assumption that AM is hidden from all
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problems (in particular, V) cannot be enforced within
FOPL, as mentioned in Sec. 2. This failure, which causes
the above contradiction, can be circumvented in the logic
NAFL [6-8], as noted in Secs. 6-7. Tien Kieu [9-12] has
argued that quantum algorithms can in fact sidestep
Cantor’s diagonalization argument (used in Turing’s
proof) and therefore the quantum version of W can, in
principle, exist. In what follows, we suggest that Kieu’s
thesis can possibly be supported in NAFL, which rejects
Cantor’s diagonalization argument (see Sec. 6) and has
the potential to admit both autonomic and quantum
computing systems.
4. Summary of proposed scheme for an ACS
Fig. 1 illustrates our proposed scheme. The notation
is as follows.
ACS Autonomic computing system (autonomic
element).
AM Autonomic manager.
CS Computing system (managed element).
i, j Initial states of CS.
p Problem associated with CS.
QE Quantum encryption software.
S The infinite class of all initial states
(generated algorithmically).
P The infinite class of all problems (generated
algorithmically).
OC Optimization criteria
PC Planning criteria
W Algorithm to determine if an arbitrary p is
correctly handled by an arbitrary i.
O Optimization software (used by W) that
determines candidate initial state(s) j to handle
p optimally.
A Auxiliary software used to formulate a plan of
action based on the analysis returned by the
Analyze module and possibly other factors.
Here A determines the unique initial state j to handle
a given problem p and schedules any required switch
from i to j. Note that A may possibly have to decide
between multiple candidates for j returned by the
Analyze module, and may also overrule all candidates in
special cases. Fig. 1 builds upon the architecture in Ref.
[3] (see pp. 43-45 and Fig. 2 therein). The new features
of our proposed scheme are as follows.
• Our ACS is meant to be truly autonomic, handling
infinitely many possible problems and initial states
                            Autonomic Manager  (AM)
                     Analyze                          Plan
                            W + O                       A
     Monitor
        i  +  p                Knowledge                    Execute
                                    S, P, OC, PC                    i   j
       Managed Element   (CS)
                     i      p
                QE
QE QE
QE
        ACS
    p
4of the CS. The external inputs to the CS from other
ACS or humans are also classified as problems of
the CS, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
• The algorithms used by AM are quantum algorithms
(whose metamathematical existence is supported by
NAFL) in our scheme. Here AM is an entity that is
distinct from the CS, which uses only classical
computing techniques; in particular, S and P are
classical entities. Further, AM is insulated from the
CS and all problems by in-principle-unbreakable
quantum encryption (as shown in Fig. 1 by the
dashed lines), so as to practically enforce the above-
noted distinction between the AM and the CS and
ensure that the ACS does indeed remain fully
autonomic.
• The above is in contrast to the scheme proposed in
Ref. [3], wherein the authors state on pg. 44 that
“Fully autonomic computing is likely to evolve as
designers gradually add increasingly sophisticated
autonomic managers to existing managed elements.
Ultimately, the distinction between the autonomic
manager and the managed element may become
merely conceptual rather than architectural, or it
may melt away – leaving fully integrated, autonomic
elements with well-defined behaviours and
interfaces, but also with few constraints on their
internal structure.” Our analysis shows that the
existence of such a self-referential entity as
proposed by these authors is not logically possible in
the fully autonomic case (by Turing’s argument in
classical logic and by the Main Postulate in NAFL;
see Sec. 3 and the ensuing sections). The distinction
between the AM and the CS must necessarily be
maintained, say, by using quantum algorithms and
quantum encryption as we have proposed.
Other than these distinctions, the modules in Fig. 1
titled Monitor, Analyze, Plan and Execute function
largely as envisaged by the authors of Ref. [3], drawing
upon a common Knowledge element.
5. Introduction to NAFL
In this section, we give, for the sake of completeness,
a brief description of NAFL and explain how it justifies
quantum superposition and entanglement (which are vital
ingredients of quantum algorithms). In particular, NAFL
resolves the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox in
favour of quantum mechanics; see Sec. 5.2. This
description will help the reader appreciate the arguments
given in the ensuing sections on the importance and
potential of NAFL for the theoretical understanding of
autonomic/quantum computing systems. See Refs. [6-8]
for more details on NAFL.
In NAFL, there are no truths in just the language of a
theory, unlike classical/intuitionistic/constructive logics –
truths for formal propositions exist only with respect to
axiomatic theories, which use the same language, well-
formed formulae and rules of inference as FOPL (for
convenience, we restrict ourselves to FOPL systems
which use natural deduction, although this is not
essential). However, the Main Postulate of NAFL,
explained below, imposes restrictions on NAFL theories.
There do exist absolute (Platonic, metamathematical)
truths in NAFL, but these are truths about axiomatic
theories and their models. As in FOPL, an NAFL theory
T is defined by its axioms and the theorems deduced from
the axioms, using the inference rules; T is defined to be
consistent if and only if there exists a model for T and a
proposition Q is undecidable in T if and only if neither Q
nor its negation ¬Q is provable in T.
5.1. The Main Postulate of NAFL and
justification of quantum superposition
If a proposition Q is provable/refutable in a consistent
NAFL theory T, then it is true/false with respect to T
(henceforth abbreviated as “true/false in T”), i.e., a model
for T will assign Q to be true/false. If Q is undecidable in
a consistent NAFL theory T, then the Main Postulate of
NAFL asserts that Q is true/false in T if and only if Q is
provable/refutable in an interpretation T* of T. Here T*
is an axiomatic NAFL theory that, like T, resides in the
human mind and acts as the “truth-maker” for (a model
of) T. Note that for a fixed T, T* could vary in time
according to the free will of the human mind that
interprets T; for example, T* could be T+Q or T+¬Q or
just T itself at different times for a given human mind, or
in the context of quantum mechanics, for a given
‘observer’. Further, T* could vary from one observer to
another at any given time; each observer determines T*
by his or her own free will. The essential content of the
Main Postulate is that a proposition Q that is undecidable
in a consistent NAFL theory T is true/false in T if and
only if it has been axiomatically declared as true/false
with respect to T (by virtue of its provability/refutability
in T*). In the absence of any such axiomatic declarations,
i.e., if T* is chosen such that Q is undecidable in T*, then
Q is neither true nor false in T, and consistency of T
demands that the law of the excluded middle and the law
of non-contradiction fail in a non-classical model for T in
which Q&¬Q is the case (see Proposition 1 of Ref. [6]
and its proof, which is reproduced here in Appendix A).
In this non-classical model, ‘Q’ denotes that “¬Q is not
provable in T*” and ‘¬Q’ denotes that “Q is not provable
in T*”. Thus one can see that Q, ¬Q and Q&¬Q are
indeed non-classically true in this model, and the
quantum superposition principle is justified by identifying
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declarations” of truth/falsity of Q (by virtue of its
provability/refutability in T*). However, this
identification is only an informal convention and need not
always hold, as explained in Sec. 5.2. Note also that Q
and ¬Q are classically ‘neither true nor false’ in the non-
classical model, where ‘true’ and ‘false’ have the
(classical) meanings given in the Main Postulate.
See Sec. 2 of Ref. [6] for a detailed discussion of the
Schrödinger cat example in NAFL. The essence here is
that an observer who ‘measures’ the cat to be alive or
dead makes the corresponding axiomatic declaration via
its provability in the interpretation QM* of a suitably
formalized theory QM of quantum mechanics. Thus when
the cat is measured to be alive (dead), the observer could
take QM* = QM + Q (¬Q), where Q is the QM-
undecidable proposition “The cat is alive”.  Until such an
axiomatic declaration is made (which need not coincide in
time precisely with the measurement), the cat is in a
superposed state of “neither alive nor dead”, i.e., in the
state Q&¬Q; this superposed state means that the cat has
not been axiomatically asserted (and in tune with the
above convention, measured) by the observer to be either
alive or dead.  It is important to note that the axiomatic
declarations are made by the observer using his/her free
will; an NAFL theory T only “sees” these axiomatic
declarations of truth which may, but need not, coincide
with what the observer sees in the real world. Of course,
if the proposition is not about the real world, then no
“measurement” exists. NAFL correctly handles the
temporal nature of truth via the time dependence of the
interpretation T* of a theory T; if the cat is put into the
box at t = 0 and measured (axiomatically asserted) as
alive at t = 1, then the proposition R that “The cat was
alive for 0 < t < 1” can be formalized and proven in the
interpretation QM* because R would only apply for t ≥ 1.
Note that R does not conflict with the superposed state
Q&¬Q, which applies for 0 < t < 1.
NAFL is more in tune with the Copenhagen
interpretation (CI) of quantum mechanics than the many-
worlds interpretation (MWI). Bohr’s principle of
complementarity easily follows in NAFL. To assert that
one cannot measure both Q and  ¬Q in a single
experiment (where Q is undecidable in QM), translates in
NAFL to the requirement that Q&¬Q cannot be asserted
as an axiom of QM*. Indeed, Q&¬Q is not even a
legitimate proposition of QM (see the ensuing paragraph)
and such an illegal axiomatic assertion would clearly
make QM* inconsistent. Here it should be noted that
NAFL is not a paraconsistent logic [25]; see the last
paragraph of Sec. 7 for further discussion of this fact. But
NAFL differs from CI in that it does not require the
“collapse of the wavefunction” (see Sec. 5.2). The non-
classical model in which quantum superposition holds is a
superposition of two or more classical models (or
‘worlds’); here ‘(non)-classical’ is used strictly with
respect to the status of the proposition Q which is being
considered. In this limited sense, MWI is vindicated in
NAFL. NAFL is the only logic that correctly embodies
the philosophy of formalism [8]; NAFL truths for formal
propositions are axiomatic, mental constructs with strictly
no Platonic world required. As noted earlier, truths about
axiomatic NAFL theories are Platonic and the law of the
excluded middle applies to such truths. Thus an NAFL
theory is either consistent or inconsistent and a formal
proposition is either provable or refutable or undecidable
in that theory, irrespective of our present state of
knowledge concerning these truths. These Platonic
notions, which include that of provability, undecidability
and the existence of a (non-classical) model for an NAFL
theory (and hence, quantum superposition and
entanglement) are strictly metamathematical concepts that
are not formalizable in NAFL theories.
An NAFL theory T requires two levels of syntax [6,
8], namely, the ‘theory syntax’ and the ‘proof syntax’.
The theory syntax consists of precisely those propositions
that are legitimate, i.e., whose truth in T satisfies the Main
Postulate; obviously, the axioms and theorems of T are
required to be in the theory syntax. Further, one can only
add as axioms to T those propositions that are in the
theory syntax. In particular, neither Q&¬Q nor its
negation Q∨¬Q is in the theory syntax when Q is
undecidable in T; this will be justified below. The proof
syntax, however, is classical because NAFL has the same
rules of inference as FOPL; thus ¬(Q&¬Q) is a valid
deduction in the proof syntax and may be used to prove
theorems of T. For example, if one is able to deduce
AQ&¬Q in the proof syntax of T, where Q is
undecidable in T and A is in the theory syntax, then one
has proved ¬A in T despite that fact that ¬(Q&¬Q) is not
a theorem (in fact, not even a legitimate proposition) of T.
This is justified as follows: ¬(Q&¬Q) may be needed to
prove theorems of T, but it does not follow in NAFL that
the theorems of T imply ¬(Q&¬Q) when Q is
undecidable in T. Let A and B be undecidable
propositions in the theory syntax of T. Then AB
(equivalently, ¬A∨B) is in the theory syntax of T if and
only if AB is not (classically) deducible in the proof
syntax of T. It is easy to check that if AB is deducible
in the proof syntax of T, then its (illegal) presence in the
theory syntax would force it to be a theorem of T, which
is not permitted by the Main Postulate: in a non-classical
model for T in which both A and B are in the superposed
state, A&¬B must be non-classically true. If one replaces
B by A in this result, one obtains the previous conclusion
that ¬(A&¬A) is not in the theory syntax. For example,
take T0 to be the null set of axioms. Then nothing is
provable in T0, i.e., every legitimate proposition of T0 is
undecidable in T0. In particular, the proposition
6(A&(AB))B, which is deducible in the proof syntax
of T0 (via the modus ponens inference rule), is not in the
theory syntax; however, if AB is not deducible in the
proof syntax of T0, then it is in the theory syntax. Note
also that ¬¬A⇔A is not in the theory syntax of T0;
nevertheless, the e`quivalence' between ¬¬A and A holds
[8] in the sense that one can be replaced by the other in
every model of T0, and hence in all NAFL theories.
Indeed, in a non-classical model for T0, this equivalence
holds in a non-classical sense [8] and must be expressed
by a different notation.
The notion of ‘observer’ and ‘measurement’ in the
real world or that of ‘axiomatic declaration’ of truth
cannot be formalized in the theory syntax of NAFL
theories (see  Sec. 2 of Ref. [6]). To see this, again
consider the Schrödinger cat example and assume to the
contrary that A is the formalized version of the
proposition that “At t = 1 the observer measured
(axiomatically declared) the cat to be alive”. Then QM
does not prove either A or ¬A, but would require A∨¬A
to be a theorem, in violation of the Main Postulate (see
Proposition 1 of Appendix A). Hence A cannot be in the
theory syntax of QM; however, A∨¬A is a legitimate
deduction in the proof syntax of QM.
5.2. Quantum entanglement explained and EPR
paradox resolved in NAFL
Let A (B) be an undecidable proposition of QM about
a given particle X (its distant entangled counterpart Y)
such that A⇔B is deducible in the proof syntax of QM. If
no measurements are made, let the observer set QM* =
QM, so that both A and B are in the superposed state.
Note that A&¬B (or B&¬A) is non-classically true in the
resulting non-classical model of QM, which explains why
A⇔B cannot be a theorem of QM in NAFL and is
therefore not in its theory syntax. If A is measured at a
given time, the X-observer (who is local to the particle X
and learns of this measurement) sets QM* = QM + A and
it follows that QM* must prove B in NAFL. Thus the
axiomatic declaration of A via QM* entails the
simultaneous axiomatic declaration of B (with respect to
QM) and there is no mystery associated with
entanglement in NAFL. It is only when A is interpreted
strictly as a ‘measurement’ on the particle X, as is
necessary in standard QM, that one is at a loss to explain
how a simultaneous measurement happened on its distant
entangled counterpart Y. Indeed an observer who has not
learned of the measurement of A, such as, the Y-observer
(local to the particle Y), will not make any axiomatic
declarations and will therefore continue to have QM* =
QM in his interpretation. Thus both A and B continue to
be in the superposed state for the Y-observer, despite the
axiomatic declarations of the X-observer. There is no
contradiction involved here, because the superposed state
only means that the Y-observer has made no axiomatic
declarations regarding A and B in his interpretation.
Indeed, the Y-observer could even axiomatically declare
A and B to be false, using his free will, despite that fact
that he will always measure B to be true (given that the X-
observer has measured A to be true). As noted earlier, it is
each observer’s free will that determines his or her
axiomatic declarations (or their absence) and there is no
inconsistency if different observers have different, even
contradictory, interpretations of QM in mind.
Indeed, the fact that B could be made false for the Y-
observer via an axiomatic declaration, despite the X-
observer’s measurement (and axiomatic declaration) of A,
is crucial for the justification of the superposed state of B
and A from the Y-observer’s point of view. This would
not be possible if B is interpreted strictly as a
measurement, for as noted earlier, there is no possibility
for the Y-observer to measure B to be false, given the X-
observer’s measurement. It is in this sense that the earlier
proposed (informal) convention of identifying
‘measurement’ with ‘axiomatic declaration’ breaks down.
Hence standard QM (unlike NAFL) would need the
infamous “instantaneous collapse of the wavefunction” to
argue that the X-observer’s measurement of A
instantaneously destroys the superposed state of B for the
Y-observer. In NAFL, if and when the Y-observer learns
of the X-observer’s measurement, or when the Y-observer
makes a measurement on Y, he could set QM* = QM + B
and deduce A in QM*. Note that both QM + A and QM +
B are identical theories that effectively declare A and B
axiomatically with respect to QM. The Y-observer, after
his measurement (and axiomatic declaration) of B, could
also assert retroactively that A and B were true from the
(earlier) instant at which the X-observer made his
measurement of A; as noted in the context of the
Schrödinger cat example in Sec. 5, such a retroactive
assertion would not temporally contradict the superposed
state of A and B which actually held for the Y-observer at
that instant (and later).
Non-locality is not a problem in NAFL, which rejects
the relativity theories and non-Euclidean geometries [13-
16] for essentially the same reason that it accepts
superposition and entanglement – the Main Postulate. In
Refs. [14-16], propositions P and Q (which could be
based on probabilistic events, for example) have been
exhibited such that the Lorentz transformations require
P⇔Q to be a theorem of the theory of special relativity
(SR). It immediately follows that the undecidability of P
and Q in SR would make SR inconsistent in NAFL (it is
argued in Refs. [14-16] that such inconsistency can be
deduced even within FOPL). Essentially the same
argument can be adapted to the present context of
entanglement, if one treats A and B as undecidable
propositions describing probabilistic spacetime events
7regarding the distant entangled particles X and Y (see
Appendix B). It can be shown that the Lorentz
transformations would again require A⇔B to be a
theorem of QM despite the undecidability of A and B in
QM; such theoremhood is prohibited in NAFL as noted
earlier.  Thus NAFL, which requires space to be
Euclidean and time to be absolute, rejects the presently
accepted arguments that quantum entanglement is
compatible with the relativity theories despite non-
locality. These arguments usually assert that the said
compatibility follows from the fact that there is no faster-
than-light information transfer from X to Y, despite the
presence of non-local correlations in the properties of
these particles. In summary, NAFL resolves the
celebrated Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox [17]
in favour of quantum mechanics and non-locality, as
opposed to relativity and locality.
It turns out that the requirement of the existence of the
non-classical model, which is the main difference
between NAFL and FOPL, severely restricts classical
infinitary reasoning. For the purposes of this paper, the
most important restriction is that infinite sets cannot exist
in consistent NAFL theories, essentially because they are
self-referential objects whose undecidability of existence
in a theory postulating only hereditarily finite sets would
violate the Main Postulate (see Sec. 3 of Ref. [7]).
However, an infinite proper class can and indeed, must
exist within an NAFL theory whenever that theory admits
infinitely many objects described by that class, which is
identified by a suitable property in the language of the
theory. For example, if a theory, such as, Peano
Arithmetic, admits infinitely many natural numbers, then
that theory must necessarily prove [8] the existence of the
infinite proper class of all natural numbers. This is a vital
difference between NAFL and FOPL that causes these
two logics to diverge profoundly in their predictions. In
FOPL theories, infinitely many objects satisfying a given
property, such as, natural numbers, can exist without
entailing the existence of either the infinite class or
infinite set of these objects within that theory – such
existence requires an additional postulate. Consequently,
Peano Arithmetic admits non-standard models in FOPL,
but not in NAFL, where the existence of non-standard
integers would be a contradiction [8]. Crucially,
quantification over infinitely many infinite (proper)
classes is banned in NAFL because such quantification
treats infinite classes as mathematical objects, i.e., as sets.
Cantor’s diagonalization argument fails in NAFL,
essentially because it is self-referential in nature and
requires illegal quantification over proper classes (e.g.,
real numbers). For the same reasons, Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems do not apply to, and Turing’s
halting problem is decidable in, consistent NAFL theories
[6, 8]. Hence consistency of Peano Arithmetic demands
its completeness in NAFL, as opposed to incompleteness
in FOPL.
6. The failure of Turing’s argument in NAFL
Let us examine further, from the point of view of
NAFL, the reasons for the decidability of the halting
problem. A Turing machine, by definition, must either
halt or not halt. Hence if Q is the proposition that a given
Turing machine halts, then Q∨¬Q is unavoidably built
into the definition of that Turing machine. It then follows
that Q cannot be undecidable in any consistent NAFL
theory in which the existence of that Turing machine is
formalized – the required non-classical model for that
theory in which Q&¬Q is the case cannot exist as
demanded by the Main Postulate of NAFL because the
said theory proves Q∨¬Q (see Proposition 1 of Appendix
A). In fact, any infinite proper class must be recursive
(and hence, recursively enumerable) in NAFL theories –
whether a given object belongs to that class cannot be
undecidable in a consistent NAFL theory because the
required non-classical model for that theory in which the
said object neither belongs to nor does not belong to that
class cannot exist. Such existence would violate the
axiom of extensionality for classes, which is an essential
ingredient of any consistent NAFL theory in which
classes exist. Hence there must necessarily exist an
algorithm (but not necessarily a classical algorithm, as
explained in Sec. 7) for enumerating the elements of any
infinite proper class in NAFL, and in particular, Turing’s
halting routine H must exist in NAFL, unlike FOPL.
Another way of understanding the argument for the
existence of H in NAFL is as follows. Let C be the class
of all program-data set pairs, i.e., C consists of all
elements of the form {Pi, Dj} where Pi is an arbitrary
program (which is an instruction set for a Turing
Machine) and Dj is an arbitrary data input. For any set
consisting of an arbitrary finite number k of elements of
C, there does exist in NAFL a halting routine Hk which
correctly outputs all the yes-no decisions on whether a
program in a given element of that set halts or not halts on
the data input in that element. But then in NAFL, it
necessarily follows that the corresponding infinite class of
halting routines {Hk} must also exist, or in other words,
there must exist a property in the language of the theory
(in which the halting problem is formalized) that defines
this infinite class. Since non-standard models for
arithmetic do not exist in NAFL [8], this infinite class
must be recursive. Indeed, the assertion that Hk exists for
arbitrary (finite) k already uses the fact that k can only be
standard finite in NAFL, i.e., non-standard integers do
not exist, and amounts to requiring that there exists a
bijection between the class N of all natural numbers and
the class {Hk}. The existence of such a mapping in NAFL
means that there exists an algorithm that will identify the
8kth element of the class {Hk} for an arbitrary k, but such
an algorithm could be non-classical and hence need not
necessarily exist within the theory that proves the
existence of {Hk}, as will be elaborated upon in Sec. 7.
The required halting routine H can then be constructed
upon using this mapping; H, which cannot exist in FOPL,
will give the correct halting decisions for all the infinitely
many elements of C. The intuitive reasoning here is as
follows; the existence of infinitely many algorithms in the
class {Hk} means that ‘all’ the halting decisions
associated with the class C have been listed
algorithmically, by the elements of {Hk}. In NAFL, this is
only possible if there also exists an algorithm H that lists
the class of infinitely many halting decisions associated
with C. Unlike in classical logic, an infinite class of
NAFL cannot be “completely” listed by the finitary
process of counting one (or finitely many) elements at a
time [15]; indeed, by induction, such a counting process
can never be considered complete, for there will always
exist infinitely many elements remaining to be counted.
Hence the existence of the class {Hk} implies the
existence of H in NAFL, although H need only exist
metamathematically, as will be explained in Sec. 7.
In the NAFL model of computation, an algorithm
(even if it has a classical representation) computes an
infinite class by accessing, at some point, a truly random
element of that class. In NAFL, the Main Postulate
requires that such a random or arbitrary element, when its
value is not specified, is in a superposed (or universally
quantified) state of assuming all possible values in the
class [8, 15] at the same time. Thus NAFL supports the
non-standard models of quantum (hyper-)computation
that allow for infinite parallelism [27], and also supports
Kieu’s claim [9] that hyper-computation is possible
because of the ability of quantum algorithms to compute
truly random numbers. Such hyper-computation is ruled
out in the standard models of quantum computation [26].
 Turing’s construction of a program that calls H to
implement the anti-diagonal halting decisions is banned
in NAFL because the said program has to necessarily be
impredicatively defined using the class of ‘all’ programs
and is self-referential in nature. Indeed, to even speak of
the diagonal sequence is illegal in NAFL because it can
only be defined as a diagonal by illegal quantification
over proper classes. Careful consideration of Turing’s
argument will show that it treats a program together with
its associated infinitely many possible data inputs as a
‘completed’ infinite mathematical entity and quantifies
over infinitely many such entities, effectively treating
these as infinite sets. Such illegal (from the point of view
of NAFL) quantification over proper classes is present in
every version of Turing’s argument for the unsolvability
of the halting problem (or for the existence of non-
computable functions) and in Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems, all of which make use of some form of
Cantor’s diagonalization. Here one must note that in some
versions of Turing’s argument which make use of explicit
self-reference, the said quantification is seemingly
masked, but is nevertheless present when one takes into
account the elaborate procedure (as established by
Gödel’s diagonalization lemma and the Gödel-numbering
scheme) needed to encode the explicit self-reference. As
an example, consider the version of Turing’s argument
where a program X(x) (with data input x also set as equal
to X)  calls the halting routine H to determine whether
X(X) halts and then, to establish the contradiction, does
the opposite of whatever H determines. The process of
encoding the self-reference requires the diagonalization
lemma and the corresponding quantification over infinite
classes. The existence of H is (metamathematically)
provable in NAFL, unlike classical and intuitionistic or
constructive logics, and so H really outputs the correct
decision on whether a given legal program halts or not on
a legal data input. Hence the contradiction that results
from Turing’s argument only establishes X(X) as an
illegal, self-referential construct in NAFL, rather than the
non-existence of H.
Infinite sets do not exist in consistent NAFL theories
(as established by the detailed formal argument in Sec. 3
of Ref. [7]). The intuitive reason is as follows. An infinite
set can only be defined via universal quantifiers, which,
in NAFL, refer to the universal class [8]; this makes the
above definition self-referential (and hence, illegal in
NAFL), since the universal class contains the infinite set
in question. Cantor’s diagonalization argument is indeed
self-referential from the point of view of NAFL in the
sense that it requires quantification over (infinitely many)
infinite classes, effectively treating these as infinite sets.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Turing’s argument
both lead to (or more correctly, presume) the existence of
non-standard models of Peano arithmetic (PA), a
contradiction in NAFL [8]. Indeed, non-standard integers
can only be modelled by infinite sets and quantification
over these is unavoidable in non-standard models of PA,
which therefore cannot exist in NAFL. This fact clearly
establishes the infinitary nature of the arguments of Gödel
and Turing (and Cantor’s diagonal argument), which
makes these illegal in NAFL.
The existence of H in NAFL must be formalized in
such a manner as to avoid self-reference that leads to
quantification over proper classes. Here we run into an
apparent difficulty. A classical Turing Machine (TM) is
an infinite object in the sense that it has an infinite tape,
representing an infinite memory. There are infinitely
many non-halting TM’s, each of which may use up an
infinite amount of memory and the issue is how one may
legally quantify over such TM’s in NAFL. Here it is
crucial to note that the NAFL version of H only
formalizes the infinitely many proofs that TM’s halt or
not halt, given their programs (which are finite
9instruction sets, or transition rules), rather than formalize
the TM’s themselves. In particular, a proof that a program
does not halt (or halts) is a finite object and such proofs
can be encoded as natural numbers or binary strings and
quantified over. Intuitively, one may consider a proof of
non-halting as representing a “potential” infinity of
computational states assumed by the TM. Hence
decidability of the halting problem is essential even for
the purpose of formalizing it legally in NAFL. Contrast
the situation in FOPL, where the undecidability of halting
that results from Turing’s argument forces the existence
of infinitely many TM’s that do not halt with no
corresponding proofs of non-halting. In the absence of a
proof, one can only represent non-halting as a genuine
infinite class of computational states assumed by the TM,
which may be thought of as a “completed infinity” and
illegal in NAFL. Thus one sees again that Turing’s
argument forces quantification over infinite classes in
order to even formalize the halting problem, thereby
effectively requiring the existence of infinite sets.
Exactly the same reasoning as above shows that the
algorithm W of Sec. 2 must also exist in NAFL. The
master virus V of Sec. 3 that is defined impredicatively,
using the class of all viruses, is an illegitimate, self-
referential entity (requiring illegal quantification over
infinite classes) in NAFL theories.  It immediately
follows that an autonomic computing system (ACS) as
defined in Sec. 2, can indeed exist in NAFL. Note
however, that we have not proven that the ACS of NAFL
must necessarily use only classical computing techniques
(Turing machines). Indeed, NAFL is a non-classical logic
that does permit quantum superposition and
entanglement, which are essential ingredients of quantum
algorithms, and our proof that W (and H) must exist is a
metamathematical and non-classical proof that uses the
Main Postulate of NAFL. This is elaborated upon in the
ensuing section, where we demonstrate that quantum
algorithms may indeed be essential for implementing our
theoretical model of an ACS in NAFL.
7. The link between autonomic and quantum
computing in NAFL
As noted in Sec. 2, the various problems (in the
infinite class P) that afflict given initial states (in the
infinite class S) of a given autonomic computing system
(ACS) must not have access to the functioning of the
autonomic manager (AM). Such access would make the
purported ACS fail and require human intervention. AM,
among other tasks, uses the algorithm W to decide
whether a given problem is correctly and optimally
handled by a given initial state of the ACS. Indeed, if a
problem P0 can access AM, it also has access to P, S and
W, which clearly makes P0 a self-referential entity that is
defined using the class of ‘all’ problems P. NAFL (unlike
FOPL) bans such self-referential entities, which is the
essential reason for the failure of Turing’s argument in
NAFL (see Sec. 6). At this stage the reader might wonder
how one can prevent a determined hacker, who wishes to
create P0, from accessing the code implementing AM, and
in particular, the algorithm W and those that enumerate P
and S (which are used by AM). Any fully classical
encryption technique, that does not make use of truly
random numbers, can be broken. Hence FOPL offers no
foolproof method for preventing the hacker from
accessing AM, creating P0 by using the above-mentioned
(classical) algorithms, and thereby make the ACS fail and
in fact, nonexistent via Turing’s argument.
Let us now consider how the above difficulty may
possibly be resolved in NAFL. We noted in Sec. 6 that
NAFL requires the algorithms H and W to exist and
further, there must exist algorithms that enumerate the
infinite classes P and S; denote these by P* and S*
respectively. However, the proof that we gave in Sec. 6
for the existence of these algorithms (i.e., the proof that
any infinite class must be recursive in NAFL) was both
non-classical and metamathematical; this proof used the
Main Postulate of NAFL. Indeed, as noted earlier, the
Main Postulate uses concepts like undecidability of a
proposition within a theory, the consistency of a theory
and the existence of a non-classical model for a theory, all
of which are strictly metamathematical concepts that
reside in the metatheory and cannot be formalized in the
language of NAFL theories. These metamathematical
concepts cannot be admitted in either the theory syntax or
the proof syntax of NAFL theories, essentially because
admitting them would amount to illegal self-reference and
require a violation of the Main Postulate. A very
important non-classical feature of NAFL is that it requires
any theory that proves the existence of infinitely many
objects satisfying a given property to also prove the
existence of the corresponding infinite class of such
objects. While NAFL also requires that any such infinite
class must be recursive, the algorithm that enumerates
this infinite class need not be classical and its existence
need not be formalizable within the theory (that proves
the existence of the infinite class in question), because the
proof of said recursiveness appeals to the Main Postulate
of NAFL; see the first paragraph of Sec. 6.  However, if
existence of the said algorithm cannot be formalized
within the NAFL theory, then it must necessarily exist in
the metatheory, in which non-classical models for that
theory reside. Note that we have accepted a modified
Church-Turing thesis in the following form: Any
recursive class must be effectively computable (i.e., there
must exist an algorithm that computes it), although not
necessarily by classical Turing machines. Thus
“recursive” or “computable” in NAFL does not
necessarily mean “computable by a classical Turing
machine”. Here one must keep in mind that the non-
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classical features of NAFL mentioned above cause many
classical results in recursion theory (due to Gödel and
Post) to fail in NAFL. An intuitive explanation for this
thesis was given in Sec. 6. We will elaborate further on
the necessity for this thesis in future work that deals with
real analysis in NAFL. It follows that the algorithms H,
W, P* and S* need only exist metamathematically and
can be non-classical, essentially because the existence
proof for these algorithms appeals to the
metamathematical and non-classical concepts inherent in
the Main Postulate. It should be emphasized that the
formalism (represented by the proof syntax and the theory
syntax) of NAFL theories, whose rules of inference are
classical, will admit only classical concepts; the Main
Postulate further restricts the formally admissible
concepts to be non-self-referential.
Let us suppose that NAFL can formalize quantum
mechanics as the theory QM. Quantum algorithms will
reside in the metatheory of QM, because these use the
strictly metamathematical concepts of quantum
superposition and entanglement, which are justified using
the Main Postulate of NAFL (see Sec. 5). If our model of
an ACS can also be formalized in QM, then the solution
to the self-reference problem noted earlier is to use
quantum algorithms for the autonomic manager AM. In
particular, our suggestion is that the algorithms W, P* and
S* (and possibly other algorithms of AM as well) be
encoded using quantum computing techniques. Note that
we restrict S and P to be classical, i.e., the initial states of
the ACS and the problems that afflict them are modelled
using classical algorithms. Indeed, only classical
algorithms can be formalized and encoded into the theory
syntax of NAFL theories, in particular, QM. Clearly,
requiring AM to be encoded using quantum algorithms
makes it a metamathematical entity, residing in the
metatheory of QM, and naturally eliminates the self-
reference problem in the sense that no element of P or S
can access AM and its algorithms W, P* and S*. Further,
to make our proposed scheme practical, AM can be
protected using quantum encryption techniques, which, if
realized, are in principle unbreakable (see Ref. [18] for a
recent review article on quantum cryptography). This will
ensure that a hacker will never be able to access the code
for AM.
In conclusion, NAFL provides the natural logical
framework (via syntax and semantics) for the theoretical
analysis of autonomic computing systems, including
establishment of the link with quantum computing. The
use of quantum computing and quantum encryption
techniques makes AM a non-classical, metamathematical
entity in NAFL that supervises the infinitely many
(classical) initial states and (classical) problems of an
ACS, represented in the infinite classes S and P
respectively. If one can establish the existence of a
quantum algorithm for W in NAFL, this would vindicate
the work of Kieu [9-12], who argues for a quantum
algorithm that solves Hilbert’s tenth problem (equivalent
to the halting problem). Finally, the reader may object
that if quantum computing can be used in AM, why
should S and P be restricted to be classical? Since
Cantor’s diagonal argument fails in NAFL, removing the
above restriction should in principle be possible;
however, if quantum algorithms are permitted in S and P,
the entire ACS (rather than just AM) will become a
metamathematical entity in NAFL. The model theory for
the non-classical models of NAFL theories (in particular,
QM) must be developed in a paraconsistent logic [25], in
whose theories contradictions are provable. The existence
of a fully quantum ACS, that permits quantum algorithms
in S and P as well as in AM, can be studied in the
framework of such a paraconsistent model theory.
Incidentally, note that the Main Postulate of NAFL,
which requires the existence of non-classical models for
consistent theories with undecidable propositions,
actually justifies the need for a paraconsistent logic,
something that was not apparent earlier. It should be
emphasized that NAFL is not a paraconsistent logic in the
strict sense because provability of contradictions is not
permitted in consistent NAFL theories. Indeed, the NAFL
notion of consistency, which requires the existence of
non-classical models for certain theories as noted above
(in addition to the classical models), is actually stronger
than the corresponding classical notion and severely
restricts classical infinitary reasoning.
8. Concluding remarks
This paper highlights the importance of logical
considerations in deciding whether an autonomic
computing system (ACS) can exist in principle. Classical
first-order predicate logic (FOPL) makes the prediction
that an ACS that uses only standard computing techniques
(i.e., classical Turing machines) cannot exist because of
Turing noncomputability via Cantor’s diagonalization
argument. We have shown how Turing’s argument fails
in NAFL, which therefore does permit an ACS to exist
and facilitates the link between autonomic and quantum
computing. Future work will outline how a limited
version of real analysis can be executed in NAFL, despite
the non-existence of infinite sets and the illegality of
quantification over infinite proper classes within NAFL.
This should pave the way for an axiomatization of
quantum mechanics in a single logic (NAFL), without the
present need to jump from quantum logic to FOPL. Such
an axiomatization in NAFL, apart from having profound
implications for the foundations of physics, will be very
useful for the theoretical study of quantum and autonomic
computing systems.
We close with a few brief remarks on quantum logics
[19-22] and intuitionistic/constructive logics [23, 24], and
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contrast them with NAFL. Quantum logics have been
developed as empirical tools to handle certain “weird”
aspects of quantum mechanics, such as, superposition and
entanglement; see Sec. 17 of Ref. [19], where the authors
remark:
“It seems to us that quantum logics are not to be regarded
as a kind of ‘clue’, capable of solving the main physical
and epistemological difficulties of QT [quantum theory].
This was perhaps an illusion of some pioneering workers
in quantum logic.”
The empirical and ad-hoc nature of quantum logic means
that it cannot be used to justify abstract aspects of
quantum mechanics which require, for example, real
analysis, where FOPL is used. Therefore, presently one
has to abruptly jump from quantum logic to FOPL (i.e.,
develop a kind of logical “schizophrenia”, as noted by M.
L. Dalla Chiara) in order to understand quantum
mechanics. The absence of a single logical framework for
quantum mechanics makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to resolve outstanding issues like the (in)compatibility
between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.
Further, conceptual treatment of subjects like autonomic
computing and computability theory is not possible in
quantum logic. In contrast, NAFL justifies quantum
superposition and entanglement via a deep
metamathematical principle (the Main Postulate) which is
universally applicable in all contexts. Hence NAFL, if
developed to its full potential, can provide a single logical
framework in which quantum mechanics as well as
quantum and autonomic computing systems can be
studied. The axiomatic nature of NAFL truth implied by
the Main Postulate has very deep implications for the
foundations of theoretical science and mathematics, and
deserves to be studied further.
Intuitionistic and constructive logics [23, 24] also
deny the law of the excluded middle and attempts have
been made to justify certain aspects of theoretical physics,
including quantum mechanics, in these logics. These
logics nevertheless uphold the law of non-contradiction,
which is very problematic [6] from the point of view of
internal consistency; see the last paragraph of Appendix
A for a critique of the intuitionistic law of non-
contradiction. As a consequence, intutionistic and
constructive logics admit infinite sets and Cantor’s
diagonalization argument. The resulting undecidability of
the halting problem means that, in particular, truly
autonomic computing systems cannot exist in these
logics, as opposed to NAFL.
Appendix A. Proposition 1 and its proof
Here we reproduce Proposition 1 and its proof from
Ref. [6].
Proposition 1. Let Q be an undecidable proposition in a
consistent NAFL theory T. Then Q∨¬Q and ¬(Q&¬Q)
are not theorems of T. There must exist a non-classical
model for T in which Q&¬Q is the case.
Proof. By the Main Postulate of NAFL, Q (¬Q) can be
the case in T if and only if Q (¬Q) has been asserted
axiomatically, by virtue of its provability in T*. In the
absence of any such axiomatic assertions, (e.g. if T* = T),
it follows that neither Q nor ¬Q can be the case in T and
hence Q∨¬Q cannot be a theorem of T. The classical
refutation of Q&¬Q in T proceeds as follows: ‘If Q (¬Q)
is the case, then ¬Q (Q) cannot be the case’, or
equivalently, ‘¬Q (Q) contradicts Q (¬Q)’. But by the
Main Postulate, this argument fails in NAFL and amounts
to a refutation of Q&¬Q in T* = T + Q (T + ¬Q), and not
in T as required. Careful thought will show that the
classical refutation of Q&¬Q in T is the only possible
reason for ¬(Q&¬Q) to be a theorem of T, and it fails in
NAFL. The intuitionistic (constructivist) refutation of
Q&¬Q in T is flawed and also fails in NAFL, as will be
shown in the ensuing paragraph. By the completeness
theorem of FOPL, which is taken for granted in NAFL, it
follows that there must exist a non-classical model for T
in which Q&¬Q is satisfiable.                                         
Consider the law of non-contradiction as stated in a
standard system of intuitionistic logic due to S. C. Kleene,
namely, ¬Q (QR). This formula asserts that from
contradictory premises Q and ¬Q, an arbitrary
proposition R can be deduced, which is absurd. Hence
¬(Q&¬Q) seemingly follows. However, note that in
intuitionism, truth is provability (not necessarily in a
specific theory T); together with the intuitionistic concept
of negation, it follows that an assertion of ¬(Q&¬Q) is
the same as deducing an absurdity from Q&¬Q, or
equivalently, from contradictory premises Q and ¬Q. But
we have seen that the ‘absurdity’ referred to here is
precisely the fact that any proposition can be deduced,
given contradictory premises! The above ‘proof’ of
¬(Q&¬Q) from contradictory premises, mandated by the
intuitionistic concepts of truth and negation, is flawed
because any proposition can be so deduced. Note that this
‘proof’ is formally indistinguishable from one in which
¬(Q&¬Q) is substituted for the deduced arbitrary
proposition R. In NAFL, it is not possible to deduce an
arbitrary proposition from contradictory premises [6, 7],
and so the flawed intuitionistic argument for ¬(Q&¬Q)
fails in any case.
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Appendix B. Failure of relativistic locality in
NAFL
Let X and Y be distant, stationary particles in the
inertial frame of reference F1. Let A and B be
probabilistic (undecidable-in-QM) spacetime events
related to X and Y respectively, such that quantum
entanglement requires A⇔B to be in the proof syntax of
QM in the F1 frame. For example, A could express that
“The y-spin of X at the coordinates (x, t) = (0, 0) is +1/2”,
while B stands for
“The y-spin of Y at the coordinates (x, t) = (ξ, 0) is –1/2”.
Let F2 be another inertial frame moving relatively to F1
as shown in Fig. 2, where F1-O and F2-O are observers at
the origins of the respective frames and coinciding with
the particle X at (t, t’) = (0, 0).
X Y
A B
F1-O (x, t) = (0, 0) (x, t) = (ξ, 0)
        F2-O (x’, t’) = (0, 0) (x’, t’) = (ξ’, τ)
A’ B’
                                              y
                x
 	  
Let F1-O observe A, and hence, deduce B by
entanglement, at t = 0. Further, no measurements are
made prior to t = 0, so that the superpositions A&¬A and
B&¬B hold for F1-O at times t < 0. Similarly, F2-O
observes A’ (which is just A expressed in the indicated F2
coordinates) at t’ = 0 and the superposition A’&¬A’ holds
for F2-O at times t’ < 0. By the Lorentz transformations,
F2-O (at time t’ = 0) deduces B’, which is B expressed in
the F2 coordinates indicated in Fig. 2, with τ > 0. This is
so because the Lorentz transformations require A’⇔B’ to
be a theorem in the F2 frame. But for t’ < τ, the Main
Postulate of NAFL requires the superposition B’&¬B’ to
hold for F2-O. In particular, for 0 < t’ < τ, F2-O deduces
A’&¬B’, in violation of the theorem A’⇔B’ required by
the Lorentz transformations. This is essentially the NAFL
objection to relativistic locality and the Lorentz
transformations [13-16]. Indeed, for 0 < t’ < τ, the
probabilistic (undecidable-in-QM) spacetime event B’ has
not yet occurred for F2-O, and so F2-O could in principle
axiomatically assert either B’ or even ¬B’, or choose not
to make either assertion (in which case the superposition
B’&¬B’ holds), by the Main Postulate of NAFL. But
special relativity theory does not recognize time as an
explicit entity with the division of events into present,
future and past, and consequently, requires F2-O to assert
B’ at t’ = 0, thereby “instantaneously collapsing” the
superposed state of B’&¬B’ to B’. Thus special relativity
theory does not permit the possibility ¬B’ (and hence,
even the superposed state B’&¬B’) for F2-O at times
0 < t’ < τ, in violation of the Main Postulate of NAFL.
Note that by definition of a probabilistic event, B’ must be
undecided for F2-O at times t’ < τ, leaving open either
possibility B’ or ¬B’. The argument given above shows
that special relativity theory is intolerant of intrinsically
undecidable, probabilistic events even within classical
logic [14-16]. Note also that prior to t = 0 (t’ = 0) both A
and B (A’ and B’) are unambiguously in the superposed
state for F1-O (F2-O), by the Main Postulate of NAFL. In
particular, A&¬B  (A’&¬B’) hold for F1-O (F2-O) prior
to t = 0 (t’ = 0), and the Lorentz transformations are again
violated.
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